Public Service Commissioning:
A catalyst for better citizen outcomes
Foreword

I’m pleased to share with you EY’s guide to Public Service Commissioning: A catalyst for better citizen outcomes.

As Governments face the reality of shrinking budgets, they need to consider new and more efficient ways to deliver public services.

The current models alone including public private partnerships will not meet the growing demand for future services. New models relying more heavily on the private and non-government sectors will be required.

In this report, our aim is to shed some light on the key areas Governments and agencies need to consider when thinking about commissioning, based on both local and international experience.

Our Government and transactions teams are available to work with you in generating ideas on how best to meet the challenges ahead.

We look forward to bringing you papers in the future as we continue to help our clients navigate through this important area.

I hope you find this report useful and insightful.

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Public Service Commissioning: A catalyst for better citizen outcomes

Commissioning can be a powerful catalyst of change provided you know what you are doing because learning through your own experience can be costly.
At its core, commissioning is about creating new ways to leverage value and improve delivery of public services. It refers to the way Governments and the public sector can allocate available resources – through the right mix of government, private and not for profit involvement – to secure and deliver services which meet public policy objectives while also providing sustainable value for citizens and the economy.

Governments around the world face spiraling costs to deliver public services. At the same time budgets are shrinking and voters show no appetite for tax increases. But they are still demanding better value and greater choice and control over the services they receive.

The nature and type of services needed is becoming more complex and the pressure on governments to deliver the best possible outcomes within the finite resources they have to allocate is growing.

Governments must challenge the status quo and find new ways of collaborating with and leveraging the capabilities of the private and not-for-profit sectors to deliver services at the same or better levels of quality more cheaply.

We believe the adoption and use of public service commissioning provides a powerful catalyst to making a radical change in public service delivery. This means creating an increasingly mixed public service market in which contestability, competition and collaboration between public, private and non-government service providers is actively encouraged.

This new reality builds on previously used contracting arrangements such as outsourcing, private financing and privatisation, but much more is needed.

While these established approaches have helped drive improvement over time, the world in which public services are now being delivered has profoundly changed, and will continue to do so into the future. Commissioning is a direct response to this changing world.

New innovative arrangements are needed – ones that play to the strengths of the public, private and not-for-profit sectors and draw upon a wide range of service delivery and business models that allow governments and citizens to influence how services are delivered while achieving better outcomes.

Commissioning ways of the past will no longer cut it, we believe new models are needed. In this new world, while the public service still has a role to play in service delivery, it is increasingly being required to transition from being a doer to being an enabler and a creator, steward and regulator of public service markets.

New ideas are needed, but the ability to execute is essential

Committing to implementing commissioning is only the beginning. The ability to execute successfully is what will separate the winners from the losers. Learning from the experience of others is vital.

We believe that many of the key drivers, thinking and elements evident in the implementation of public service commissioning in the UK already exist in Australia and New Zealand, but are not as mature nor as pressing as in the UK where despite years at it, they are embracing commissioning faster and harder than ever before.

This paper taps into the world’s leading thinkers in public service delivery and examines international and local case studies to look at ‘what works’, ‘what doesn’t’ and what can be done to address some of the common problems that arise.

The paper starts by discussing what commissioning is and what’s different about it. How it stands to change the role of government is the subject of the second part of this paper. The paper concludes with 10 key considerations to accelerate your thinking about what you must get right when tackling commissioning and contestability of government services.
Commissioning – what’s different

Commissioning requires a major shift in thinking about the role of the public service in delivery of government services. Scaling back the public service to doing what is core and capitalising on the strengths of private and non-government organisations is required to deliver services better and more cheaply.
A means to an end, not the end in itself

The use of commissioning for public services has emerged as a key mechanism to drive better value and outcomes for citizens, especially in the UK where it originated and has received bi-partisan political sponsorship and support from successive governments.

At its simplest, commissioning could be seen as the latest evolution in the journey to reform public service delivery, and a natural progression from the historical funding and procurement of public services. Applied systematically, its impact can be transformational and profound.

The concept and practice of commissioning public services has emerged because there is already a significant public service market in operation in most advanced economies in which public, private and not-for-profit service providers operate. This mixed market has evolved over time and will continue to grow. As it does, the role of governments will change to focus increasingly on designing and managing these mixed markets and the complex service delivery ‘ecosystems’ within them. The focus will also shift to commissioning for outcomes and not simply commissioning services.

It is important to recognise that the commissioning of services and outcomes can and does happen at multiple levels, depending on the structure of governments and nature of the services themselves.

These levels can include

- **National** commissioning for an entire system such as immigration, tax collection or border protection
- **Regional** commissioning which can extend from state based to locality based outcomes and services such as public transport, education or housing
- **Individual** user or broker led commissioning by community groups, neighbourhoods or individual citizens for services such as in-home healthcare, disability or social services.

All these developments point to the need for a much more sophisticated approach to public service delivery than simply arguing that everything should be outsourced or contested, or that the provision of services by the public sector is inferior to the private sector.

The shift that is needed

Done well, commissioning stands to have a major impact on existing roles within a public service model.

This commissioning role needs to extend from the point of identifying and assessing citizen and community needs, to developing new service systems and markets, through the entire service delivery lifecycle to evaluating the value and outcomes being achieved, and working with service providers to find new and better business and service models.

Figure A shows the shift that is needed to operate in this new world.

Figure A: A shift is required in the way the public service operates

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From government to user choice and control

Increasingly the consumer of the service needs to be placed at the centre in determining what services are needed and how these should be accessed to make best use of the available funds – in stark contrast to the public sector deciding which services will be provided by whom.

As governments look to devolve decision making as close as possible to the citizens and consumers, control is shifting away from the public sector into the hands of citizens. This devolution extends to citizens increasingly being given funding directly by governments to commission their own services¹.

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¹ Australia is adopting this approach in the implementation of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). The use of personalised budgets is more widespread in overseas countries such as the UK where it is commonplace for adult social services and increasingly for healthcare.
From doer to enabler
The most profound change to the traditional role of the public sector is a shift away from delivering services to playing a broader enabling role.

The public sector now needs to be increasingly focussed on where and how its capability can best be deployed, for example as a regulator or a manager of a market. Delivery will increasingly be undertaken by the private and non-government sectors in markets that are contestable.

From program managers to outcome managers
Traditional approaches have typically developed individual programs in response to specific issues and isolated needs whereas issues are more complex and multi-faceted; often requiring solutions and services that span multiple programs. A much more integrated approach is needed.

Measuring and paying for outcomes instead of inputs or outputs requires much more sophisticated contracting, payment and incentive arrangements to create the right behaviours and avoid the wrong ones.

From control to influence over outcomes
All too often, when responsibility for services shifts to external providers, governments end up retaining accountability and risk. In some cases, this weakens public purchasing and negotiating power, especially if governments are stuck dealing with monopoly providers, as is often the case in highly specialised services such as detention management.

Governments must identify ways to influence the quality of the providers and services, and ensure appropriate safeguards and assurances are in place for citizens.

Specifying requirements in outcome terms however requires greater creativity, innovation and risk taking on the part of public servants and on the part of service providers.

Exhibit 1 – New Zealand Criminal Justice System
When public sector agencies prioritise and focus on outputs and outcomes (rather than inputs), very different models often emerge. For example, in New Zealand, numerous justice sector stakeholders – The Ministry of Justice, Department of Corrections, NZ Police, Serious Fraud Office, Crown Law and Ministry of Social Development (for youth justice) worked together to address the top priority outcome to reduce crime and numbers in the criminal justice pipeline. To generate the collective desired outcome they created a new Justice Sector Fund, which allowed savings to be transferred between agencies and across years, meaning money could be invested to best effect.

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From siloed to collaborative
Governments need to work in more collaborative ways with citizens and service providers to co-design and co-create new solutions and business models to deliver better outcomes with the same or less funding. This requires a more relationship-based or networked way of working, and creating new ways to combine and share resources.

From contract managers to relationship managers
A potential problem that can arise from a procurement approach is to overly focus on conformity and process compliance, rather than encouraging genuinely new and different approaches from service providers. This can result in providers being unnecessarily constrained to deliver services in standardised ways which not only dis-incentivises the provider, but also puts at risk one of the key benefits of outsourcing the service in the first place.

Where governments are looking for new business models and innovative ways of delivering services, then outcome or results based specifications are needed to allow different service providers to develop their own distinctive approaches. This is particularly true for new services, but equally applies to existing services where governments are looking to maximise value for money and drive better outcomes with increasingly limited funds.

2 Delivering better public services. Reducing crimes and reoffending, results actions, plans. New Zealand Government July 2012

3 A social contract for government, Peter Shergold, in government designed for new times, a global conversation, McKinsey & Company (October 2012)
Key considerations

There is a range of key learnings and essential steps based on local and international experience with commissioning, that can be drawn upon.
1. Tailor the service model to the outcome

Commissioning isn't simply about selecting from a range of service providers or outsourcing models. Like any form of public service provision, it's about looking at what needs to be achieved and often coming up with a tailored approach for how a service should be conceived, commissioned, contracted, designed, accessed, delivered and managed.

This is not to say that we always need to reinvent the wheel. We can often draw on elements of a new structure from recent best practice examples. However, the starting place should always be the policy or service outcomes: What do we want to achieve? Who is best placed to achieve these outcomes? How can we ensure they are achieved in the most cost effective manner?

For this to occur, it is important that the public service use appropriate ways of specifying and procuring the service which is commensurate with its intended outcomes, and the nature and characteristics of the service being procured.

For discrete services such as waste management, contracting out to the private sector has delivered better, faster, cheaper outcomes. Discrete services are highly attributable, making them easier to measure and incentivise. For example, it is easy to see if waste is collected from a residential property and who is at fault if it is not.

By contrast, where achievement of outcomes is contingent on delivering a range of interdependent services as in the case of health or human services and may require many different organisations to perform a set of interrelated activities; making linkages between outputs and inputs is less clear and harder to measure.

Where services are interdependent like this, it is necessary to determine what is needed from providers, the value they can add and how complementary services can be packaged to best achieve the desired outcomes.

In these cases, traditional, prescriptive contracting mechanisms tend to be inadequate, leading to high transaction costs that do not translate into value. Instead, different forms of contracting mechanisms, which encourage collaboration and incentivise the right behaviours and performance across the entire service system, are required.

2. Rethinking the service model

In looking to unlock new and different ways to deliver better outcomes, it is important to firstly consider how the consumer interacts with the service system or ecosystem.

Often, it is assumed that the start or end of the interaction is within the boundaries of an agency or a program area when in reality there are multiple parties involved. Using customer journey or pathway mapping exposes these inefficiencies and also allows public service commissioners to conceive the service from the outside in, rather than the inside out which is how many services have traditionally been designed. This approach has been used extensively for some years in public healthcare.

It is also important to unbundle the end-to-end service delivery system to understand its component parts, and the extent to which there are different benefits to be gained from using different approaches to drive improvement for these components. In some cases the components may lend themselves to creating a mixed market whereas others may lend themselves to standardisation and consolidation.
3. Understand the demand model

To what extent is demand for services known versus not known and who drives the demand? Is the service mandated by government — as when toll road management is contracted to a single provider — or can the consumer choose the services and providers they can access?

If, as in the case of the NDIS, participants are able to choose their providers, this will require a very different contracting mechanism, as demand will be highly unpredictable. This type of demand volatility is hard for providers, who find it difficult to scale up or contract to accommodate demand levels.

It’s challenging to anticipate demand in situations such as social welfare and disability, where there is often latent demand, which had not been addressed under previous arrangements.

Typical ways of dealing with this in emerging or immature markets is to provide some level of predictability for the service providers in terms of the quantum and timing of funding they can expect to secure, to phase in moving to a full user choice model over an appropriate period of time, or provide some certainty over the volume of services they can be expected to deliver.

Unknown demand not only increases a provider’s risk but can leave the government paying more for a service than necessary if contracts are too rigid. For example, government may be contracted to pay a provider to deliver a certain number of transactions per month, but may find that average demand is much lower than expected. In such cases, the government will have to negotiate more flexible contracts, with payment caps (to protect government) or minimal income guarantees (to protect providers).

Unpredictable variations in demand also make providers unlikely to commit to upfront capital investments and establishment costs. In such cases, the government either has to bear some of the cost of setting up a new market or incentivise new providers to access an existing market. For example, the NDIS has access to an existing market of providers. However, if these providers lack the capability to operate viably under the new market model, the government may need to support them in gaining additional capability.

This is where government needs to give more open minded consideration as to where demand risk should sit. Is it appropriate to make the small fragmented care provider market accept risk that services will be required, or should government provide some certainty over a transition period by underwriting a certain minimum volume?

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Exhibit 2: NSW non-emergency patient transport

Unbundling the underlying service delivery model was a key element of the long-term strategic direction developed for non-emergency patient transport (NEPT) for the New South Wales Health system. NEPT had traditionally been delivered in a fragmented and decentralised way by individual Area Health Services and the Ambulance Service of NSW without any overarching state-wide strategy or consistent business model.

This approach created potential inefficiencies and diseconomies of scale, with individual Health Services and the Ambulance Service maintaining their own booking, scheduling and dispatch systems, as well as their own range of NEPT providers, in addition to the emergency patient transport service operated by the Ambulance Service of NSW.

As part of a multi-year reform strategy it was agreed to separate and consolidate the booking, scheduling and dispatch functions over time into a smaller number of regional hubs and invest in implementing a common IT platform which could be used by all Health Services. This would allow the standardisation and consolidation of these functions, while separating NEPT provision to allow the creation of a mixed competitive market of internal and external transport providers including Health Services, the Ambulance Service of NSW patient transport fleet, not for profit organisations and commercial transport providers.
4. **When demand exceeds affordability, seek new funding models**

In many sectors, governments can no longer afford to deliver services to meet total demand. The challenge here is to prioritise and manage demand to meet the funding envelope, or to look for new and innovative ways to fund services and outcomes. This may require public service commissioners to work with the market to co-develop completely new business models and ventures which open up new investment and funding streams, or change the way services have traditionally been funded.

Social Bonds are an emerging alternative way of funding the delivery of outcomes. These are payment-by-result contracts, where the contractor finances and carries the risk of delivering a social outcome. Bonds are funded by the subsequent savings to the government from the reduced demand for public services.\(^4\)

By focusing on developing entirely new approaches to funding and operating services, governments are able to open up new opportunities for the public sector, private sector, not for profit organisations and financiers to combine their collective expertise and ideas to create entirely new business models.

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\(^4\) Social Bonds have only recently been introduced in Australia and New South Wales has launched two Social Benefit Bond pilots for out of home care and family restoration services.

**Exhibit 3 – London Ventures, UK**

The London Ventures Program is a joint, cross-party initiative involving 32 London boroughs and the City of London, London Councils (a think tank and Local Authority lobby organisation), and Capital Ambition – a pan-sector partnership and regional improvement/efficiency program for London which the member organisations formed in 2008.

The program was created because of significant funding cuts, meaning that the Councils needed to become much more innovative in how they went about funding and delivering projects and initiatives.

The program looks to bring together the London public and private/commercial sectors to identify and implement innovative new ventures which create a commercial return for all. EY has been engaged on a three year contract to play the role of strategic advisor to the program.

The program uses a rapid six step process facilitated by EY to stimulate, receive, assess, shortlist, approve and implement innovative new commercial ventures and in the process attract investment in civic initiatives. The key emphasis is to do this as rapidly as possible, while ensuring the ventures are commercially sound for all parties. The first generation of ventures has already been implemented, with the second wave underway.
5. Understand the limitations of consumer behaviour

Sometimes, the demand side of markets is not demanding enough of service providers. Governments are discovering that the power of consumer behaviour in contributing to a healthy competitive public service market has largely been underestimated. Too often, governments have assumed that consumer behaviour will keep the market healthy. Effective competition requires demanding consumers who know what they want and where to find it. As it transpires, when it comes to public services, informed consumers who react to poor performing providers by shifting to another are the exception not the norm. The UK Nudge Unit suggests that consumer behaviour is driven by the need for keeping things simple\(^5\). While there may be good reasons for switching, if switching is complicated, then consumers tend to default to status quo.

Depending on the maturity of the market, citizens may however face a number of barriers and challenges to making informed choices. For example, the UK Institute for Government notes that social care users can lack both the information to make informed choices and the support in navigating the choices that need to be made\(^6\). Some of the main problems here are: difficulties gaining credible comparative information; a shortage of signposting; and low awareness of the options available to them.

Also, consumers can find too much choice as difficult as too little. Some regulators have tended to assume that consumer behaviour is rational and that, provided markets are contested and consumers have choice, they will automatically find the best-value products and services, driving companies to deliver better value and efficiency. In reality, consumers are busy and tend to stick to what they know, especially where choice and information is overwhelming. If we are going to get better deals from regulated markets, then regulators themselves must be more proactive in making markets work properly for consumers. That means making the price and quality of products clear and understandable, as well as the performance of service providers, so that consumers can easily compare — all of which requires conscious effort and proactive market management.

In designing public service markets, commissioners need to take these factors into account and ensure there is as much emphasis placed on effective choice as there is on effective competition. This may require the introduction of service brokers or intermediaries into the market between citizens and service providers.

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5 Nudge and Beyond: Behavioural Science, Policy and Knowing what works, Nudge Unit, (June 2012)

6 Making Public Service markets work: Professionalising government’s approach to commissioning and market stewardship, Tom Gash, UK Institute for Government (July 2013)
6. Make markets work

Mixed public service markets are continuing to emerge and mature, with significant differences in service provider capability, capacity and maturity especially in the not-for-profit sector, but there are also some regions and areas where viable markets do not exist and therefore need to be created from scratch or subsidised in one form or another. The more mixed public service markets become, the more focus governments and public servants need to place on overall market stewardship, regulation and management.

Policy makers also need to be careful to create a sustainable market in the way they fund and incentivise providers.

NDIS will use a fee-for-service arrangement that has many smaller, not-for-profit providers concerned about their ability to forecast and manage their cash flows in future. Post launch period, providers will be paid a fee for service rather than being offered block funding in advance. Clearly, this model is designed to provide clients with improved access, control and choice over the services they receive. However, to make this radically new model work, the government will need to do more to prepare the market for operating in this more volatile and competitive marketplace. This is not just about building workforce capability, but rather building the capability and capacity of providers to operate a sustainable, competitive business.

In order to act as informed buyers or agents, public service commissioners also need to understand the nature, dynamics and performance of the existing market. It is rare to encounter well-functioning, competitive mixed markets for public services. Often there may be no organised market, as was the case when the planning started for the Australian e-health system, which had simply not existed before. Or the starting point will be one monopoly provider, or a highly fragmented industry, such as Australia’s aged care sector.

Diversity and quality of supply may be naturally limited in some sectors, such as offender management, or in rural and remote areas. Other times, there are barriers to entry such as high upfront capital costs or long lead times required to build a capable workforce.

In these cases, governments can create incentives to encourage new entrants into the market while also helping existing providers to build their capacity and capability. This approach has been used over many years to support the development of the non-government sector in health, community service and public housing sectors.

Exhibit 4 – NSW Out of Home Care

Sometimes the impetus for reviewing and changing a market comes from some form of dysfunction. For example, in the case of out-of-home care services for at risk children and young persons in New South Wales, the demand for services exceeded supply, costs were escalating and there were inconsistent service standards.

In this context, Government was a price taker, and not a price maker, and in some instances there was significant inequity in the service system between providers.

Another key issue was the lack of sufficient incentives for service providers to move children and young people, where appropriate, from high cost Intensive Residential Care, to different less intense levels of general foster care.

In order to create a more sustainable and viable market, the Government had to intervene and introduce consistent standards, unit prices and better allocate demand across NGO service providers.

This required a ‘whole of market’ perspective and approach to optimise supply and demand, while also considering ongoing service provider viability, capacity and capability. It also required the introduction of incentives to encourage service providers to transition clients to the most appropriate and cost effective level of support.
7. **Understand the real costs**

While there is evidence to support the theory that other sectors will deliver some services more cost effectively, when it comes to not-for-profits, it’s hard to establish what the real costs are. The issue is that not-for-profits attract volunteers and charitable donations, which end up being negotiated into service agreements.

Thus, not-for-profits can end up subsidising service delivery - an inherently unstable and unsustainable situation. This problem can be compounded by not-for-profits having to invest in additional systems, processes and capabilities to deliver and manage services to meet their reporting and compliance obligations to governments. This has the effect of adding cost unless careful attention is paid not to over-specify these obligations and controls.

Public servants also need to better understand the cost and profit drivers of the for profit sector. Where private sector operators can deliver services at lower cost this is often because they are able to leverage economies of scale and skill, standardisation, lower cost service delivery channels and use alternative employment and workforce arrangements. These cost advantages can however be eroded by public servants imposing unnecessary constraints, which ultimately results in higher costs.

8. **Use price to drive efficiency**

Establishing a consistent efficient price is a common and essential feature of public service markets because of the need to ensure services are equitably and appropriately funded, especially where markets offer widely varying prices to consumers for equivalent services. This is even more important where the end consumer or citizen is going to buy their services directly and would therefore benefit from knowing what the services should typically cost.

Doing this however is not straightforward, especially where funding and pricing have to take into account multiple variables. For example, a failure to weight the number of pupils correctly in a funding equation could see schools within overlapping catchment areas on different sides of a boundary receiving radically different levels of funding per pupil.

It is critical that pricing and funding models take account of these variables and do not dis-incentivise providers, or conversely encourage perverse outcomes. This often takes time to get right, especially where the costing and pricing of services must take into account multiple variables and factors which will result in a differential cost and therefore pricing outcome.

9. **Manage performance and incentives**

The performance of service providers and markets is only as good as the effort which goes into managing them by customers and regulators, and the mechanisms which exist to measure, monitor and evaluate the outcomes being achieved. Simply having multiple providers doesn't always lead to better results. Failing to manage under-performance can also dis-incentivise better performing service providers and lead to customer and community disillusionment.

To avoid this issue, public service commissioners should develop clear mechanisms for periodic performance reporting and evaluating the performance of providers, as well as the payment and incentive structures used to fund them. This is particularly important to avoid establishing perverse incentives or unintended consequences which can sometimes arise when reward structures are first introduced.

‘Gaming’ behaviours can include ‘parking’ service users with complex needs and ‘creaming’ users who are easier to support and more profitable to serve. For example, in a UK return to work program, a combination of low fees and the unfortunate design of a payment-by-results system actively discouraged providers from assisting those who were less likely to get back to work quickly - the people who most needed the service.

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7 Op cit, Gash (July 2013)  
8 Op cit, Gash (July 2013)
Exhibit 5 — UK Commissioning Academy

The Commissioning Academy is a development program for senior commissioners from all parts of the UK public sector. It is designed and delivered by the UK Cabinet Office and a mix of delivery partners. It includes a series of eight development days spread out over a six month period, including site visits to commissioning organisations and in-depth discussion with a range of commissioners and providers.

The focus is on practical peer-led learning, not technical training. Over the eight days a wide range of commissioning issues are explored, such as outcome-based commissioning, working with the voluntary and community sector, market engagement and development, joint commissioning across organisational boundaries, and new models of service delivery such as mutuals.

The Academy has been set a goal of training 1,500 public service commissioners over a three year period. Participants are nominated by agency chief executives, drawn from agencies across the UK and put through the Academy program as a cross-agency cohort.

10. Invest in new capabilities and knowledge management

The adoption of public service commissioning requires public servants to shift their thinking and traditional roles, but also impacts on consumers and end-users. Making this shift requires developing or acquiring new core capabilities. It also requires a pro-active approach to knowledge management and experience based learning to build on the experience of others and create new communities of practice.

Our experience over the past decade with commissioning in the UK suggests there are five key capabilities which the public service needs to focus on strengthening:

► Customer engagement — knowing and understanding the needs of end-users and customers of public services, the outcomes which need to be achieved and designing service systems and solutions with customer and end-user input

► Market stewardship — understanding the key elements to creating and sustaining healthy markets and encouraging behaviours that create value for customers and end-users

► Commercial management — understanding the key factors to be considered when designing and using commercial contracting approaches, innovative funding models, incentives and results-based payment mechanisms, and knowing how to administer these effectively

► Risk management — recognising, owning and managing risks in engaging alternative service providers, and using new approaches to deliver value-based outcomes

► Value management — measuring public value and actively managing outcomes along the end-to-end commissioning lifecycle to deliver it

This is an area where political and central government leadership is critical to building sector wide capability, collaboration and learning.

Conclusion

Commissioning provides governments with the opportunity to meet the challenge of rising community expectations and falling funding by looking for new ways to provide better services.

However, translating the concept into reality requires a fundamental shift in thinking, skills and approach.

There are no short cuts. This is especially true for governments wanting to move beyond the experimental phase and start embedding commissioning at the core of how public services are conceived, delivered and managed.

In this paper we have outlined some of the key considerations for governments and agencies. We highlight potential benefits as well as some of the associated risks and the need for an informed, strategic and realistic approach to implementation.

We look forward to working with you as you embark on a new reality in public service delivery.

9 Great Public Services need Great Commissioning, EY UK (May 2007)
## Contacts

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S1326064
ED 0414

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