9 minute read 25 Aug 2020
Recast India’s fiscal and monetary policy frameworks

Is it time to recast India’s fiscal and monetary policy frameworks?

By D. K. Srivastava

EY India Chief Policy Advisor

A noted economist, D.K. Srivastava is an Honorary Professor at Madras School of Economics and Member of the Advisory Council to the 15th Finance Commission.

9 minute read 25 Aug 2020
Related topics Tax

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It is time to reconsider India’s macro policy frameworks, not just in the light of their experienced weaknesses but also in view of India’s future needs and compulsions.

With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, India’s macro parameters have been thrown out of gear. The fiscal deficit on the combined account of center and state governments in FY21 may slip well above 10% of estimated GDP. At the end of FY21, the combined debt-GDP ratio of the central and state government may cross 81% of GDP, more than 20% points above the targeted threshold of 60% as per center’s revised Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA) of 2018. The CPI inflation rate crossed the 6% upper tolerance limit of the monetary policy framework (MPF) in 4QFY20 and 1QFY21 and may remain close to 7% in the near future. In fact, India’s economic crisis predates the pandemic. The weaknesses of the FRBMA and the MPF had already started becoming visible with FY20 real and nominal GDP growth rates plummeting to debilitatingly low levels of 4.2% and 7.2% respectively. It is high time that we consider recasting India’s macro policy frameworks, both fiscal and monetary, not only in the light of their experienced weaknesses but also considering India’s future needs and compulsions. This issue is discussed in detail in the In-Focus section of the August 2020 issue of the EY Economy Watch.

Infirmities of center’s 2018 FRBMA

With the combined debt-GDP ratio likely to depart from the target level of 60% by more than 20% points at the end of FY21, it would render the 2018 amendment to the FRBMA completely out of alignment. In fact, the 2018 FRBMA has a number of other infirmities:

  1. Elimination of revenue deficit target: Maintaining balance or surplus on revenue account is critical since it is linked to government sector dissaving. For realizing India’s potential growth, it is critical to maximize the savings rate. One important instrument for this is to maintain government’s revenue account in balance or in surplus. This was also the primary objective of center’s 2003 FRBMA. The target of maintaining a revenue account balance has been given up in Center’s 2018 FRBMA.
  2. Inconsistent targets for debt and deficit for center and states: Maintaining a fiscal deficit target of 3% of GDP for both center and states is inconsistent with targeting debt-GDP ratio of 40% for center and 20% for states. Simulations indicate that debt-GDP ratio for center and states should be equal if their fiscal deficit targets are equal.
  3. Inadequate countercyclical clauses: Center’s 2018 FRBMA has a provision for countercyclical measures. It provides for five conditions under which a departure from the operational fiscal deficit target of 3% of GDP can be made. These conditions relate to: (a) national security, (b) act of war, (c) national calamity, (d) collapse of agriculture severely affecting farm output and incomes and (e) structural reforms in the economy with unanticipated fiscal implications. The COVID-19 pandemic may be classified as a national calamity under clause (c) above. However, in a pandemic like situation, the magnitude of permitted departure has proved to be too inadequate. Further, the 0.5%-point departure rule has also proved to be too impractical to capture the evolving situation.

Infirmities of the monetary policy framework

There are two important deficiencies in the monetary policy framework in the current Indian context. First, there is no emphasis on the growth objective for the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to consider. Second, the CPI inflation target of 4% on average implies an IPD-based inflation of 2.5-3%. This is too low and inconsistent with the fiscal policy framework which assumes a nominal GDP growth of 11-12%.

In the case of fiscal policy decisions, two implicit assumptions regarding nominal GDP growth are important. First, with respect to GST, the states were guaranteed a growth of 14% in nominal terms in their GST revenues. This guarantee was implemented through the mechanism of the compensation cess. A 14% growth in GST revenues assumes a combination of GST buoyancy and nominal GDP growth. A buoyancy of 1.2 for the component of GST attributable to states (SGST + states’ share in IGST) implies a nominal GDP growth of 11.7% per annum. The Union Budget FY18 had also assumed a nominal GDP growth of 11.75%. According to the minutes of the 3rd GST Council Meeting held on 18-19 October 2016, most state ministers had argued for a 14% growth over the base year GST revenue, considering a nominal GDP growth of 12% or above.  Second, for stabilizing the combined debt to GDP ratio at 60% with a 6% combined fiscal deficit-GDP target as per center’s 2018 FRBMA, the implicit nominal GDP growth rate works out to be nearly 11%. These growth assumptions turned out to be much higher than the nominal GDP growth outcome driven by the MPF. The MPF targeted a CPI inflation of 4%. The IPD based inflation during FY15 to FY20 was below the CPI inflation by 1.2% points on average. This implies that a CPI inflation target of 4% was associated with an IPD based inflation of 2.8% during FY15 to FY20. Combining the average IPD based inflation at 2.8% with the average real GDP growth at 6.8% during FY15 to FY20, the resultant nominal GDP growth comes out to be 9.8%. Thus, there is a built-in inconsistency between the two macro policy frameworks.

Suggested reforms

a.     Fiscal framework

  1. The 2018 version of FRBMA should be re-amended.
  2. The new FRBMA should bring back revenue account balance as a key target for both central and state governments.
  3. There is a case to consider the need for introducing asymmetric targets for fiscal deficit and correspondingly for debt relative to GDP for the central government vis-à-vis. the state governments. Center’s fiscal deficit and debt may be kept at somewhat higher levels in the current circumstances of the Indian economy given the macro stabilizing role that the center undertakes and the need to build infrastructure in the next five years or so. We may consider a combination of 40% of debt-GDP ratio and 4% of fiscal deficit to GDP ratio for the center and 30% of debt-GDP ratio and 3% of fiscal deficit-GDP ratio for the states considered together. These are stable combinations at a nominal annual growth rate of 11%. Together, the debt-GDP ratio target can thus be increased to 70%. It may be noted that for the last 30 years, the combined debt-GDP ratio of the central and state governments has remained close to 70% with some inter-year variations.
  4. The combined fiscal deficit to GDP ratio at 7% can be financed by an equivalent surplus in the household sector savings. The net borrowing requirement of the non-government public sector and the private corporate sector taken together, of 2.5-3% of GDP, can then be met by net capital inflows. As revenue deficit of central and state governments is progressively reduced to zero, this would become quite feasible.
  5. This level of fiscal deficit for the government can be sustained at a suitable level of saving-investment combination consistent with the potential growth rate of 8%. At an incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) of 4.5, an investment rate of 36% would be required to generate this growth. Considering 2.5% of GDP as the sustainable level of net capital inflows, a domestic saving rate of 33.5% is required. This can be obtained by combining (a) household sector saving rate at 19% with a financial saving component of about 8%, (b) private corporate saving rate of 10.5%, and (c) public sector saving rate of 4%. These are only marginally above those achieved by household and private corporate sectors in recent years. The main improvement is to be brought about in public sector saving for which keeping government’s revenue account in balance is necessary.
  6. State governments should be given a specific macro stabilization role particularly for agricultural cycles which may be handled by establishing an Agricultural Cycle Stabilization Fund (ACSF).
  7. Non-agricultural cycles should be handled by a rule-based flexibility of nearly 1% point of GDP in center’s fiscal deficit wherein there should be a mechanism for ensuring that departures of fiscal deficit from its average target are followed symmetrically in cyclical upturns and downturns so that the debt-GDP ratio remains sustainable and stable.

b.     Monetary framework

  1. The monetary policy framework of 2015 should be amended.
  2. The MPC should keep in mind, a growth objective although it is to be monitored by the suggested Macro Policy Coordination Council.
  3. The target variable may continue to be CPI.
  4. The target CPI inflation rate may be kept at 5% on average with a tolerance range of +/-2% points. This would be consistent with an IPD based inflation rate of 4% on average (Table 2).

c.     Institutional framework

  1. Macro Policy Coordination Council should be established. It may serve a number of objectives but the most important would be to provide a framework in which monetary and fiscal policy decisions are coordinated. It may also deal with instances of structural breaks caused by extraordinary exogenous events such as a pandemic or a war.
  2. Growth and inflation targets should be defined for both of these frameworks in a mutually consistent way. The Macro Policy Coordination Council may aim at a potential real GDP growth rate of 8%, a nominal GDP growth in the range of 11-12%, a CPI inflation of 5% with a flexibility of +/-2% or equivalently, an IPD based inflation of 4% with a flexibility of +/-2%. The combined debt-GDP target should be 70% with 40% for the center and 30% for the states. Correspondingly, the fiscal deficit targets should be 7% for the general government with 4% for center and 3% for states (Table 1).
FRBMA targets
Monetary Policy Framework

The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and economic trends preceding it have highlighted certain infirmities and inconsistencies in India’s macro policy frameworks as consisting of fiscal and monetary policy frameworks. These need to be recast and supplemented with an institutional framework such as the setting up of a Macro Policy Coordination Council which can coordinate between monetary and fiscal authorities. This become more relevant when we consider India’s contemporary economic challenges in the backdrop of the evolving global situation. In the In-Focus section of this issue, it is demonstrated that with marginal changes in the fiscal and monetary policy frameworks, India can aspire to achieve and sustain a real GDP growth of 8% while keeping CPI inflation close to 5%.

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  • Download full pdf for Aug 2020 issue of Economy Watch

Summary

It is demonstrated that with marginal changes in the fiscal and monetary policy frameworks, supplemented with an institutional framework such as the setting up of a Macro Policy Coordination Council, India can aspire to achieve and sustain a real GDP growth of 8% while keeping CPI inflation close to 5%.

About this article

By D. K. Srivastava

EY India Chief Policy Advisor

A noted economist, D.K. Srivastava is an Honorary Professor at Madras School of Economics and Member of the Advisory Council to the 15th Finance Commission.

Related topics Tax