Like all infrastructure, migration capacity requires deliberate investment, coordination and commitment over years, if not decades.
For example, housing development in the US takes an average of two years from planning to occupancy.31 Building credential-recognition frameworks and fast-track licensing pathways typically requires several years of negotiation and implementation. The Quebec-France nursing agreement, for example, took more than three years to establish.32 Integration services – language training, job matching, cultural bridging – need years to scale effectively. Social infrastructure – the trust and acceptance that enables integration – can take generations to mature.
The bottleneck is less about demand or supply and more about absorption infrastructure.
Countries, starting now can, position themselves to have significantly more capacity in the next two decades when demographic needs peak.
The absorption capacity challenge
Physical infrastructure serves as an impediment to migration, as much as policy or labor demand. Even before accounting for migration surges, housing shortages plague multiple major receiving metros, including Toronto, Dubai, London and Berlin. Urban infrastructure wasn’t designed for rapid population surges and construction can’t scale fast enough without accelerated builds starting now.
In 2023, Canada added 5.1 residents per new housing unit compared to a historical average of 1.9.33 Australia only managed to build one home for every 3.2 migrants in 2023 and one new property for every 2.1 migrants in 2024.34 Germany has forecast a need for more than 2.5 million new dwellings by 2030.35 Meanwhile, construction timelines average 18 to 24 months, creating a lag between migration surges and housing availability.
These ratios translate to real choices: families of four sleeping in one room, skilled workers choosing not to migrate because they can't find housing, wages consumed entirely by rent, leaving nothing for integration. Infrastructure isn’t cold statistics; it’s whether a family invited to fill labor shortages can build a life in a community with adequate housing, schools and services – or arrives to find the same infrastructure deficits that existing residents already face.
It’s important to recognize that these pressures don’t just constrain newcomers; they also squeeze existing residents, driving up rents, crowding schools and hospitals and intensifying political resentment over perceived competition for scarce resources.
Cities can’t absorb faster than housing and services can scale. Without accelerated construction starting now, these gaps will persist well into the future. Regardless of labor market needs or humanitarian imperatives, absorption capacity is a binding constraint on migration flows.
Two cities demonstrate what deliberate housing infrastructure can achieve. Vienna’s mixed-income social housing model maintains approximately 60% of residents in publicly subsidized units, preventing the affordability spirals seen elsewhere,36 while Singapore’s regulated workforce housing accommodates 38% foreign workers through coordinated public-private development.37
Credential recognition bottleneck
One-third of highly educated immigrants in OECD countries are overqualified for their jobs, with rates reaching 73% in the Republic of Korea and 57% in Canada.38 These aren’t skill mismatches; they’re system failures. Each case represents years of training rendered worthless by credential non-recognition, families living on a fraction of their earning potential and host countries squandering talent they claim to desperately need. A surgeon drives for Uber. An engineer stocks shelves. A teacher works retail.
The WHO projects an 11 million health worker shortfall by 2030,39 yet thousands of foreign-trained healthcare workers can’t practice because credential recognition processes take months to years.
Streamlining credential recognition isn’t only about fairness; it’s economic necessity.
The systems to do this already exist. Germany’s Recognition Act has processed over 383,000 foreign qualification applications since 2012, with procedures typically completed within three months.40 Privately sponsored refugees in Canada showed 90% first-year employment rates for men, which is 17 percentage points higher than government-assisted refugees.41 These systems work when designed deliberately.
Policy volatility and coordination failure
The mismatch between long-term economic needs and short-term political cycles creates volatility. Businesses can’t build long-term talent strategies when visa rules change every election. Many political cycles run two to four years, while infrastructure returns take years or decades more to yield returns. Migration policy gets caught in this trap. It’s evaluated on election timelines while its effects unfold over generations. As Gregory Daco, EY Chief Economist, Ernst and Young LLP, observes, “Anytime there are strong and rapid net migration inflows, there tends to be a populist pushback. These rapid inflows generally prevent immediate integration which can lead to a misguided sentiment that ‘foreigners are taking our jobs.’ I don't believe that sentiment and electoral implication is going away anytime soon.”