Topics – Exemption for supplies of education – definition of an eligible body – charge to funds provided by the Secretary of State – college of a UK university – teaching English as a foreign language
St Patrick's International College Ltd, London College of Contemporary Arts Ltd and Interactive Manchester Ltd v HMRC
The Court of Appeal (CA) has released its decision in these cases concerning whether certain supplies of education made by the Appellants should have been treated as exempt for VAT purposes. It was common ground that Article 132(1)(i) of the VAT Directive is directly effective and that the Appellants are entitled to rely on it if the UK had failed to implement it properly. In brief, the Appellants say that the domestic provisions do not properly implement Article 132(1)(i) and their supplies should be treated as exempt.
In the alternative, the Appellants contend that their supplies are exempt under provisions in Group 6 of Schedule 9, VATA94 on the following grounds:
- That supplies of education by the First and Second Appellants were exempt under Item 5B of Group 6 because the consideration payable for those courses was ultimately a charge to funds provided by the Secretary of State
- That the Third Appellant was ‘a college of a UK university’ and thus an eligible body within Note 1(b) of Group 6; and/or
- That since the Third Appellant provided the teaching of English as a foreign language (TEFL) and was therefore an ‘eligible body’ within Note 1(f) of Group 6, all of its supplies of education should be treated as exempt
These appeals are concerned with higher education courses. The appellants are all members of a group of companies known as Global University Systems Group (GUS). The education provided by each of the appellants in the relevant period can be summarised as follows:
- St Patrick's International College Limited (SPIC) operated a further and higher education college in London providing, amongst other courses, a range of HNCs and HNDs in business management, tourism and hospitality, technology and health and social care
- London College of Contemporary Arts Limited (LCCA) was a provider of further and higher education courses in fashion, visual arts, media, business and hospitality. Until 2016 it was a school of another company in the GUS Group. From 2016 it operated in partnership with South Thames College and Walsall College, both of which are providers of further and higher education
- Interactive Manchester Limited (IMAN) offered undergraduate and postgraduate degree courses as well as HNC and HND courses, professional programmes, and certain English language courses. It was divided into four schools: an accountancy school, a business school, an English language school and a vocational school. Until 2016, IMAN also provided courses in collaboration with the University of Wales, London Metropolitan University, and Grenoble Graduate School of Business
The First-tier Tribunal (FTT) dismissed the Appellants' appeals finding that (a) the Appellants could not rely on the direct effect of Art. 132(1)(i) because the UK’s implementation (in the form of Group 6) did not infringe the principle of fiscal neutrality; and (b) except for IMAN’s supplies of TEFL, the Appellants’ supplies did not fall within the terms of Group 6.
The Appellants appealed to the Upper Tribunal (UT) on the issues concerning fiscal neutrality, on whether the consideration for their supplies was ultimately a charge to funds provided by the Secretary of State, and the scope of the exemption for IMAN. The UT dismissed the appeals on each of these points.
The Appellants were granted permission to appeal to the CA on the following grounds:
- Ground 1: the UT erred in concluding that in relation to the supplier condition in Art. 132(1)(i) the correct question is not whether the suppliers are sufficiently similar from the point of view of the typical consumer but whether they are comparable, having regard to the legal and regulatory framework under which the education is provided and the domestic legislation by which the Member State exercises its discretion to recognise other organisations
- Ground 2: even if the UT was correct to conclude as it did, a Member State cannot impose conditions for recognition which do not apply to other recognised suppliers. In particular, the UK cannot justify its failure to recognise the Appellants as Alternative Providers (APs) of higher education courses which qualify for funding from the SLC, on the basis that they do not have university title or DAPs or charitable status, when the same is true of other recognised (exempt) providers of such courses
- Ground 3: the UT erred in holding that a taxable person could be an eligible body within Note 1(f) of Group 6 in respect only of TEFL supplies and not for its supplies of education generally; Note 2 of Group 6 is incompatible with EU law
The Appellants argued that, when assessing whether the UK’s implementation of the education exemption in Article 132(1)(i) complies with the principle of fiscal neutrality, the court must apply the test established in Rank Group Plc (Rank), under which a difference in VAT treatment is unlawful where the relevant services are identical or similar from the perspective of the typical consumer and meet the same needs.
They contended that it was common ground that the HNC and HND courses they supplied were sufficiently similar to those supplied by universities and further education colleges, and that the UT erred in finding that the consumer’s perspective was not decisive.
The Appellants contended that the UT’s conclusion on this issue was inconsistent with the decision of this court in Leisure, Independence, Friendship and Enablement Services (LIFE).
HMRC argued that the Rank test applies only to the similarity of supplies and not to supplier conditions within exemptions, relying on European authorities concerning other VAT exemptions and contending that fiscal neutrality in this context is not assessed through the eyes of the consumer.
HMRC accepted, however, that its position was inconsistent with the decision in LIFE but argued that the CA was not bound by it.
The CA considered whether the UK had correctly implemented the VAT exemption for education contained in Article 132(1)(i) and, in particular, whether the exclusion of certain APs from the exemption breached the EU principle of fiscal neutrality.
The CA recalled that it was common ground that the Appellants supplied education and had educational aims similar to those of universities, colleges of universities and further education corporations (FECs), which qualified as ‘eligible bodies’ under Group 6 of Schedule 9 VATA94. The Appellants argued that the UK legislation failed properly to implement Article 132(1)(i) and that they were entitled to rely directly on the Directive.
Article 132(1)(i) exempts certain educational supplies where two cumulative conditions are satisfied: first, there must be a qualifying educational supply; secondly, the supply must be made by a public body or by another organisation recognised by the Member State as having similar objects. While Member States enjoy discretion in deciding which organisations to recognise, that discretion is constrained by EU law, including the principles of equal treatment and fiscal neutrality. Fiscal neutrality generally prohibits the different VAT treatment of similar services that compete with one another.
The FTT concluded the UK’s implementation of the exemption did not breach fiscal neutrality. It considered that the critical issue was not simply whether the educational services supplied by the appellants were similar to those provided by exempt institutions, but whether the suppliers themselves were sufficiently comparable. The FTT found significant differences between the regulatory regimes applicable to universities and colleges, which were subject to stricter requirements relating to degree-awarding powers and university title, and the Appellants, who lacked those characteristics. It also noted that FECs were required to be charities, whereas the Appellants were not. Accordingly, the FTT held that Parliament was entitled to recognise universities, colleges and FECs while excluding the Appellants. The UT upheld that reasoning.
The CA considered LIFE in detail. That case concerned welfare services exempt under Article 132(1)(g) and whether restricting the exemption to certain categories of provider was compatible with fiscal neutrality. In LIFE, the court reviewed Rank extensively and emphasised that the assessment of similarity generally requires consideration of the viewpoint of the typical consumer. Most importantly, it accepted an argument that the relevant question was whether differences in regulation made a significant difference to consumers. The CA in the present case concluded that this formed part of the ratio of LIFE. It therefore established that, when considering compliance with fiscal neutrality in relation to an Article 132 containing a supplier condition, the similarity analysis must be conducted from the perspective of the typical consumer.
The CA rejected HMRC’s arguments that LIFE was not binding. It disagreed with the suggestion that the reasoning in LIFE was insufficiently explained, holding that the Court had clearly derived its approach from Rank and had expressly applied that test to the supplier condition under Article 132(1)(g). HMRC had identified no authority overlooked by the court and no subsequent development in European jurisprudence requiring a different conclusion.
The CA also rejected HMRC’s reliance on the principle of EU law supremacy. It held that the issue was not one of conflict between domestic and EU law, but rather the correct interpretation of EU law itself. In such circumstances, ordinary principles of precedent applied, and the Court was bound by its previous decision unless one of the recognised exceptions applied.
Having concluded that LIFE was binding and that the reasoning concerning Article 132(1)(g) applied equally to Article 132(1)(i), the CA held that the FTT and UT had erred in law by rejecting the Rank test. The proper approach required assessment from the perspective of the typical consumer. Since HMRC had not challenged the Appellants’ contention that their HNC and HND courses were indistinguishable from those offered by recognised providers from the perspective of students, and had not disputed that application of the Rank test would inevitably lead to a finding that excluding APs breached fiscal neutrality, the CA considered the appeal had to succeed.
The CA therefore allowed the appeal on Ground 1. Because that conclusion was sufficient to dispose of the case, it did not determine Grounds 2 and 3, which concerned alternative challenges relating to the criteria for recognition and the scope of the exemption for providers of TEFL. The CA emphasised that the result followed from the binding authority of LIFE rather than a full reconsideration of the underlying merits of HMRC’s arguments. Lord Justice Lewison expressly observed that the Court was bound by LIFE whether it was right or wrong. Sir Launcelot Henderson and Lord Justice Lewison both agreed with the leading judgment, with the result that the Appellants’ supplies were entitled to succeed on the basis that the UK’s exclusion of APs from the exemption was incompatible with the principle of fiscal neutrality as interpreted through the consumer-focused test established in Rank and applied in LIFE.
Comments: This judgment is potentially significant for Alternative Providers and other educational institutions whose supplies are similar to those of exempt universities, university colleges or further education institutions. Such providers should consider whether they have grounds to challenge historic VAT assessments, submit repayment claims, or pursue existing disputes with HMRC on the basis that their exclusion from exemption breached the principle of fiscal neutrality. The Court held that similarity must be assessed from the perspective of the typical consumer and accepted that students would not regard the relevant HNC and HND courses as materially different from those offered by recognised exempt providers. Providers should therefore review their past and current VAT treatment, quantify any potential recoveries, and assess the impact on ongoing compliance. However, they should also be mindful that HMRC may seek to appeal the decision, as the Court indicated that HMRC’s substantive arguments had considerable force despite being bound by the earlier decision in LIFE.
For further information please contact Carolyn Norfolk.