Topics – Further Education Colleges – grant funding – consideration
Colchester Institute Corporation
The Court of Appeal (CA) has released its decision in this case concerning an appeal by HMRC against the decision of the Upper Tribunal (UT). In Colchester Institute Corporation (CIC) (CIC UT 2024), the UT held that the provision of education by CIC constituted the supply of services "for consideration" for the purposes of Article 2(1) of the VAT Directive in return for funding provided to CIC by two government agencies. In reaching that conclusion, CIC UT 2024 followed an earlier UT decision (CIC UT 2020) between the same parties.
HMRC challenged both decisions before the CA on the following grounds:
Ground 1: the UT in CIC UT 2020 erred in law in its analysis of a decision of the CJEU, C-151/13 Le Rayon d'Or Sarl v Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances of 27 March 2014 (Rayon d'Or).
Ground 2: the UT in CIC UT 2020 erred in its interpretation and application of the "direct link" requirement between the supplies made and the consideration received to meet Principal VAT Directive (PVD) requirements.
HMRC needed to succeed on both grounds of appeal to win.
CIC is a body corporate, incorporated as a further education college under the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, and registered for VAT. It is an "eligible body" for the purposes of Item 1, Group 6 of Schedule 9 of VATA 1994, and receives funding from the Education Funding Agency (EFA) and Skills Funding Agency (SFA) to deliver approved vocational education and training to eligible students, who were not charged fees. Funding was paid under detailed annual agreements, calculated largely by reference to student numbers and course characteristics, with clawback mechanisms for under-delivery.
The CIC UT 2020 proceedings arose out of a claim by CIC (in 2014) for overdeclared output tax on the basis that the provision of education to students was a business activity regardless of how it was funded. That meant that none of the buildings were put to non-business use and there was no requirement to account for deemed output VAT. CIC netted off input tax credited in the periods which were subject to the claim but did not net off the input tax credited as a result of the 2009 Lennartz claim which had been made and repaid more than 4 years earlier.
The earlier Upper Tribunal decisions (2020 and 2024) held that CIC’s provision of education was a supply of services for consideration, with the funding constituting third party consideration. HMRC considered this funding was not consideration for taxable supplies.
In the present case, HMRC raised an assessment in the amount of £123,642 to CIC for VAT periods 11/15 – 01/16. That decision was upheld on review on 13 July 2016, and CIC brought an appeal against the review decision to the FTT on 16 August 2017. That appeal was stayed pending the FTT and UT decisions in CIC UT 2020. When the appeal to the FTT in what became CIC UT 2024 was heard, it was common ground that the issue of whether CIC was making supplies for consideration was effectively determined by the decision of the UT in CIC UT 2020, and the FTT found for CIC in a decision of 4 March 2024.
On 23 May 2024, the FTT gave permission to appeal. On the appeal, HMRC reserved its argument as to the correctness of CIC UT 2020 and the appeal was dismissed on 4 December 2024. HMRC appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The CA ran through a raft of case law and considered that the authorities referred to identified a number of factors which are likely to be relevant in the assessment of whether a requisite direct link between the consideration and the services is established on the facts of a particular case. The CA considered that a direct link may be found between that service and the consideration even if it would be more challenging to establish such a link between the consideration paid and those services actually provided (rather than simply being made available). The fact the services to which the payment relates are provided for the benefit of a large and indeterminate group (e.g. potential users of public transport) or the interests of a group as whole (e.g. fruit growers), rather than individual recipients of services, will also be relevant. However, the CA held that it is important not to elevate any one of these factors into a threshold or determinative requirement.
In relation to Ground 1, the CA had to consider whether the UT in CIC UT 2020 erred in law in its interpretation of Rayon d'Or and in concluding that it was bound by virtue of Rayon d'Or to allow the appeal. In this respect, the CA held that the UT was right to conclude that the decision in Rayon d'Or was not wholly dependent on the CJEU's view that a Kennemer-type supply was in issue, and the UT was also right to conclude that the decision provided considerable support for CIC's appeal. Specifically, the CA held that:
- The terminology used by the CJEU in describing the services provided in consideration for the payments received in Rayon d'Or is scarcely redolent of the "permanent availability" classification being the determining factor in the case.
- The UT was right to point to Saudaçor as a case which did not involve a "permanent availability" service in the Kennemer-sense, but which treated Rayon d'Or and Kennemer as supporting the statement that consideration for PVD purposes could involve a flat rate payment for services provided on a permanent and continuous basis. The subsequent decision of the CJEU in EQ is to similar effect.
- Rayon d'Or did not involve a payment in respect of services provided to a fixed group of recipients identified at the date the funding was agreed, but funding calculated by reference to the resident population of an RCHE at a particular date which would change to some extent over the course of the year or indeed the multi-year duration of the contract (e.g. through deaths, residents moving out and residents moving in). This would involve not simply some change in the identity of those receiving healthcare, but a change in the dependency level of residents, and indeed the dependency level of a particular resident might change during the year. The CA considered it clear from the CJEU's decision that the use of a formula in which the number and dependency of the resident population at a particular time served as a proxy for the healthcare made available to residents during the life of the funding agreement did not preclude the existence of a direct link between the payments from the insurance funds and the services provided to residents.
On that basis, the CA accepted HMRC's submission that Rayon d'Or did not, as the UT concluded, determine the appeal in CIC's favour, there being points of distinction between the position before the CJEU in Rayon d'Or and the facts of this case. However, the CA rejected HMRC's wider submission that Rayon d'Or provides no support to CIC's case on the appeal.
In relation to Ground 2, the CA held that the correct question was whether the Funding Agencies were funding certain activities of CIC on the basis that certain conditions would be met or paying for supplies of education by CIC to eligible students. The CA considered that answering that question requires the court to undertake the multi-factorial analysis referred to by the UT in South African Tourist Board. As the UT recognised, the appropriate starting point is the terms of the Funding Agreements themselves. In the CA’s view, the terms of both Funding Agreements strongly supported the view that the Funding Agencies are paying the funds in return for the provision of services by CIC to eligible students in the form of approved courses, rather than funding CIC generally on condition it provide such courses.
The CA considered that a notable difference between this case and the Apple and Pears, Balgarska and South African Tourist Board cases, is that CIC is providing the very same services to non-eligible students as it supplies to eligible students, but because the services provided to non-eligible students do not benefit from the Funding Agreements, those students have to pay for them.
Although there is no contract between the Funding Agencies and CIC's students, the CA held that was not sufficient to break the link between the funding and the services received. One of the purposes of the statutory power in issue, therefore, was to benefit those undertaking relevant courses of education, and, to that extent, there was a degree of legal proximity between them of a kind which supports the existence of a direct link between the funding the Funding Agencies were providing and the courses eligible students were receiving.
The CA held that it is not necessary for CIC to establish that every element making up the funding was provided in consideration of the supply of courses to eligible students. It is sufficient that some part (as it happens, the major part) was so provided. There would be no difficulty in identifying and allocating that part of the funding paid in consideration for the supply of courses to eligible students.
In summary, the CA found held that, although Rayon d’Or was not determinative on its own, the Upper Tribunal was correct to conclude that there was a direct link between the EFA/SFA funding and the education services supplied to students. The funding was paid in consideration of CIC delivering approved courses to eligible students, not merely as general support. The contractual terms, per student funding methodology, reporting obligations and clawback mechanisms, demonstrated sufficient reciprocity. The fact that funding was formula based, paid in advance, and not matched exactly to individual students or courses did not break the direct link.
Comments: Further education and training providers receiving government funding may be making taxable supplies where funding is paid in return for delivering education to identified beneficiaries, even if students are not charged fees.
Public sector and grant funded bodies must carefully assess whether funding is true “general subsidy” or third party consideration, focusing on contractual obligations and reciprocity.
VAT recovery and liability positions may be affected: funding treated as consideration can bring activities within the scope of VAT, potentially improving input tax recovery but also creating output tax obligations.
Funding agreement drafting and review becomes critical, as language such as “in consideration of” and delivery linked funding mechanisms strongly point towards taxable supplies.
For further information, please contact Carolyn Norfolk or Stewart Mathieson.