Topics – Transfer of developed properties by a taxable person who has used the properties, whether making a supply of goods for consideration
T-413/25 Peckeger
On 2 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union (GCEU) released its decision in this Austrian referral which asks whether Article 2(1)(a) of the VAT Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that the transfer of developed properties by a taxable person who has previously used those properties, through rental, for the purposes of (deductible) taxable transactions, to a company of which he or she is the sole shareholder (with the result that no additional company shares are issued for that contribution) is to be regarded as a supply of goods for consideration. If answered in the negative, is the first paragraph of Article 16 of the VAT Directive to be interpreted as meaning that the transaction in question gives rise to the disposal free of charge by a taxable person, preceding the contribution, of goods forming part of his or her business assets or, more generally, their application for purposes other than those of his or her business. Does Article 19 preclude a national provision under which, in the event of a transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof (businesses or parts of businesses), it is considered that no supply of goods has taken place only in cases of reorganisation (which exists under national law only where those assets are used to generate certain kinds of income). Does Article 19 have direct effect such that a taxable person may rely on the no-supply rule before a national court against the tax authority if, before the Member State acceded to the European Union, the national legislature introduced a provision, retained since then, which is applicable only to certain cases, but not to business assets which are used to generate income (under national law on tax on profits) from rental and leasing.
This referral concerns the VAT treatment of a transfer of several rental properties by the applicant, a sole trader, to R GmbH, a company of which he was the sole shareholder and manager. The transfer was made as a contribution in kind without the issue of new shares and was treated by the applicant as a transfer of a totality of assets under Austrian restructuring legislation, meaning it was not subject to VAT. However, the Austrian tax authority disagreed, arguing that FR’s activity constituted asset management rather than a commercial business. It consequently adjusted previously claimed input VAT deductions, treating the transfer as exempt from VAT without a right to deduct.
The applicant challenged the decision and the Federal Finance Court held that the transfer did not constitute a transfer of a totality of assets. It also found that, because the contribution itself was not subject to VAT, there had been a change in the circumstances relevant to the original input tax deduction. The applicant appealed to the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court.
The referring court seeks guidance from the GCEU on three issues: whether the contribution of immovable property to a company constitutes a taxable supply under the VAT Directive; whether Member States may restrict the VAT ‘no-supply’ rule for transfers of a totality of assets to assets generating particular categories of income; and whether Article 19 of the VAT Directive, which contains that rule, has direct effect.
The GCEU recalled that Article 19 allows Member States to treat the transfer of a business, or part of a business, as not constituting a supply of goods for VAT purposes, meaning that no VAT is chargeable and the recipient is treated as the successor to the transferor. The GCEU emphasised that, where a Member State has adopted this rule, transfers of a totality of assets must generally fall within its scope. The only permitted limitations are those expressly set out in the second paragraph of Article 19, namely where restrictions are necessary to prevent distortions of competition or tax evasion and avoidance in cases involving recipients who are not fully taxable persons.
The GCEU considered that these exceptions are exhaustive and Member States cannot introduce additional restrictions. Consequently, a Member State cannot limit the ‘no-supply rule’ to transfers of businesses generating particular types of income while excluding others.
The GCEU further considered that Article 19 forms part of a wider set of provisions identifying which transactions are taxable and which are not. Its purpose is to facilitate the transfer of businesses by avoiding unnecessary VAT charges that would ultimately be recoverable through input tax deduction, thereby preventing administrative and financial burdens for business purchasers. The rule is not a derogation requiring strict interpretation, but a mechanism designed to support continuity of business activity. Accordingly, the GCEU concluded that Article 19 precludes national legislation restricting the ‘no-supply’ rule to transfers of businesses generating certain categories of income unless such restrictions can be justified under the specific grounds set out in the second paragraph of Article 19.
The GCEU also considered the referring court’s question as to whether the first paragraph of Article 19 has direct effect. Specifically, the court asked whether a taxable person could rely directly on Article 19 before a national court to argue that a transfer of a business, or part of a business, should not be treated as a supply of goods for VAT purposes where the Member State had chosen to implement Article 19 before joining the EU, but had limited its application to certain specified categories of transfer. In those circumstances, the question is whether the taxable person could invoke the wider protection afforded by Article 19 against the tax authority, notwithstanding the more restrictive national legislation.
As a preliminary matter, the GCEU noted that this question only arises if the national restriction on the ‘no-supply’ rule cannot be justified under the limited exceptions permitted by the second paragraph of Article 19. The GCEU also observed that the Austrian legislation implementing the rule predated Austria’s accession to the EU and did not appear to be protected by any standstill provision allowing Austria to maintain a different interpretation of the Directive.
The GCEU reviewed the established principles governing the direct effect of EU directives. A directive may be relied upon by individuals where its provisions are sufficiently precise and unconditional, even if the Member State has either failed to implement it correctly or has implemented it incompletely. A provision is sufficiently precise when it clearly defines the rights and obligations it creates, and unconditional when its operation is not dependent on further action by EU institutions or Member States.
Applying those principles, the GCEU found that Article 19 clearly and precisely sets out the circumstances in which the transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof is not to be treated as a supply of goods for VAT purposes. Although Article 19 grants Member States some discretion, that discretion does not prevent individuals from relying on the provision where the content of the right can be determined from the Directive itself. The GCEU emphasised that a Member State cannot rely on national restrictions that are inconsistent with EU law to deny a taxpayer the benefit of Article 19.
On this point, the GCEU concluded that the first paragraph of Article 19 has direct effect. A taxable person may therefore invoke it before a national court against a tax authority where national legislation unlawfully restricts the scope of the ‘no-supply’ rule beyond the limits permitted by the VAT Directive.
The GCEU went on to consider whether Article 2(1)(a) of the VAT Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the contribution, by a taxable person, of developed properties, let subject to VAT, in respect of which VAT is deductible, to an undertaking of which the taxable person is the sole shareholder, without any new shares being granted to that taxable person as consideration for that contribution, must be regarded as a supply of goods for consideration.
The GCEU recalled that Article 2(1)(a) applies only where a supply of goods is made for consideration, meaning there must be a legal relationship involving reciprocal performance and a payment or benefit received in return. The GCEU considered that in the immediate proceedings, the transfer of VAT-taxable rental properties by the applicant to a company of which he was the sole shareholder, without receiving new shares or any other consideration, did not involve reciprocal performance. Accordingly, subject to verification by the national court, the transfer was not a supply of goods for consideration and therefore did not constitute a taxable transaction under Article 2(1)(a) of the VAT Directive.
Finally, the GCEU considered whether the first paragraph of Article 16 of the VAT Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the contribution, by a taxable person, of developed properties let subject to VAT, in respect of which VAT is deductible, to an undertaking of which he or she is the sole shareholder, without any new shares being granted to him or her as consideration for that contribution, constitutes an application of goods forming part of his or her business assets which he or she transfers free of charge or, more generally, applies for purposes other than those of his or her business, to be treated as a supply of goods for consideration within the meaning of that provision.
The GCEU recalled that Article 16 treats certain free transfers of business assets as taxable supplies where the VAT on those assets was previously deductible. In the immediate case, the applicant transferred VAT-taxable rental properties to a company of which he was the sole shareholder without receiving any consideration. Because the transfer was made free of charge and input VAT had been deducted on the properties, the conditions of Article 16 were met. The Court therefore concluded that the transfer constituted an application of business assets for purposes other than the applicant’s business and must be treated as a supply of goods for consideration for VAT purposes.
In summary:
- Article 19 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which restricts the rule, laid down in that article, that no supply of goods has taken place upon the transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof to a taxable person, solely to transfers of certain business assets or parts of a business intended to generate certain types of income, unless such a restriction is justified by one of the grounds set out in the second paragraph of Article 19 of that directive.
- The first paragraph of Article 19 must be interpreted as having direct effect, with the result that a taxable person may rely on, before a national court, the rule that no supply of goods has taken place upon the transfer of a totality of assets or part thereof to a taxable person, against the competent tax authority, where the national legislature, before the accession of the Member State concerned to the EU, has opted for the application of that rule, but restricted the scope of that rule to certain specific cases not covered by the second paragraph of Article 19.
- Article 2(1)(a) must be interpreted as meaning that the contribution, by a taxable person, of developed properties, let subject to VAT, in respect of which VAT is deductible, to an undertaking of which the taxable person is the sole shareholder, without any new shares being granted to that taxable person as consideration for that contribution, does not constitute a supply of goods for consideration.
- The first paragraph of Article 16 must be interpreted as meaning that the contribution, by a taxable person, of developed properties let subject to VAT, in respect of which VAT is deductible, to an undertaking of which he or she is the sole shareholder, without any new shares being granted to him or her as consideration for that contribution, constitutes an application of goods forming part of his or her business assets which he or she transfers free of charge or, more generally, he or she applies for purposes other than those of his or her business, within the meaning of that provision, which is to be treated as a supply of goods for consideration.
Comments: This decision is significant because it strengthens the protection afforded by Article 19 and limits the ability of Member States to narrow its scope through domestic legislation. Taxpayers can rely directly on Article 19 where national rules are incompatible with EU law. However, the judgment also confirms that where a transfer of assets is made free of charge and previously benefited from input VAT recovery, Article 16 may still create a VAT charge even if the transfer is not a supply for consideration under Article 2(1)(a). The case therefore highlights the importance of considering both Articles 19 and 16 when restructuring property and business assets.
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