Topics – Following period definition in terms of calendar year, deduction of excess VAT
C-680/23 Modexel
On 5 December 2024 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) released its decision in this Portuguese referral asking whether the expression ‘the following period’ in Article 183 of the VAT Directive must be interpreted as referring literally to the period which immediately follows in the calendar year? If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, where an undertaking ceases its activity and subsequently recommences that activity, with a period of 15 months having elapsed between those two points in time, is that undertaking entitled to deduct the amount of the excess which it carried forward when it ceased its activity in the first assessment that it files after recommencing its activity?
Modexel declared that it had ceased to trade with effect from 28 February 2015. At that time, it reported a VAT balance in its favour of EUR12,456.20.
It recommenced trade and reported this on 10 May 2016, at which time it deducted the amount of the earlier VAT balance, seeking to offset that amount in the first return filed.
The tax authority refused the deduction, arguing that Modexel should have applied for a refund within 12 months from the date on which it ceased its activity and that, since it had not done so, that amount had reverted to the Portuguese State.
The referring Court notes that Article 183 is open to interpretation as regards the expression ‘the following period’. The dispute concerns whether, as the tax authority maintains, that expression is limited, literally, to the following tax period or whether, as a result of the practice adopted by Modexel, there may be a time lapse between those two periods on account of the cessation of activity.
The CJEU recalled that the right of a taxable person to deduct from the VAT which they are liable to pay, the VAT due or paid in respect of goods acquired and services received by them as inputs, is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT. The deduction system is intended to relieve the taxable person entirely of the burden of the VAT due or paid in the course of all his economic activities. It ensures neutrality as regards the tax burden of all economic activities, whatever the purpose or results of those activities, provided that those activities are, in principle, themselves subject to VAT. It is an integral part of the VAT scheme and cannot in principle be limited.
The CJEU noted that pursuant to Article 179, a taxable person is to deduct the tax as a whole by offsetting from the amount of tax due for a tax period the amount of VAT in respect of which the right of deduction arose and is exercised during the same period. The first paragraph of Article 183 states that, where the amount of deductions exceeds the amount of VAT due for a tax period, Member States may either carry over the excess to the subsequent period or refund the amount.
With regard to the concept of ‘subsequent period’, the CJEU considered that the use of ‘period’ in the singular, indicates that it refers to the tax period immediately following the tax period during which the amount of the deductions exceeds the amount of the VAT due. Also, pursuant to Article 252, the duration of a taxable period is to be fixed by each Member State within the limits determined by the second paragraph of that article, without it being apparent from that article, or from Article 183, that that duration, or the succession of taxable periods, depends on whether a ‘taxable person’ carries out an economic activity during all or part of a given taxable period.
However, it is apparent from the Court's case-law that the carry-forward of the refund of excess VAT over several tax periods following that in respect of which that excess arose is not necessarily incompatible with that provision,
The CJEU recalled that it is the existence of an ‘economic activity’ which justifies classification as a ‘taxable person’. Article 9(1) provides that a 'taxable person' is any person who independently carries out, in any place, any economic activity, whatever the purpose or results of that activity. Article 213(1) requires that a taxable person must declare the cessation of his economic activity to the tax authority, which must then invalidate the VAT identification number assigned to that taxable person. A person who ceases his economic activity therefore also ceases to be a taxable person for VAT purposes.
The loss of the status of 'taxable person' implies a lack of continuity of the tax periods required by the first paragraph of Article 183. Therefore, the CJEU considered that although the first paragraph of Article 183 allows excess VAT to be carried forward over several tax periods following that in which that surplus was generated, the cessation of the economic activity of the taxable person concerned has the consequence that there is no subsequent period, within the meaning of Article 183, to which that surplus may be carried forward.
The CJEU noted that the Commission had observed that giving an economic operator the possibility of carrying forward, after a resumption of economic activity, a surplus of VAT declared at the time of the cessation of the previous activity could encourage abuse and the introduction of artificial arrangements by economic operators.
In the immediate case, Modexel ceased its economic activity, and it was no longer subject to VAT. The excess VAT could not be carried forward to a subsequent period, within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 183, due to a lack of continuity between the tax periods concerned.
Also, Article 183 provides that Member States may either carry over excess VAT to the following period or make the refund in accordance with the detailed rules which they lay down. The CJEU noted that Portuguese legislation in principle combines those two methods of refunding excess VAT, but that, in the event of the cessation of any economic activity of an operator, that operator may apply for reimbursement before the end of a period of twelve months beginning from the period in which that surplus arose.
The CJEU considered that the refund and the deferral provided by Article 183 are not mutually exclusive. Also, although Member States have a certain freedom in establishing the detailed rules referred to in Article 183, those detailed rules may not undermine the principle of fiscal neutrality by making the taxable person bear, in whole or in part, the tax burden. Those detailed rules must enable the taxable person to recover, under appropriate conditions, the entire claim resulting from that excess VAT, which means that the refund must be made, within a reasonable time, by a payment in cash or in an equivalent manner, and that, in any event, the method of refund adopted must not expose the taxable person to any financial risk. Any freedom in this regard is subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
The CJEU considered that a limitation period, the expiry of which has the effect of penalising a taxpayer who is not sufficiently diligent, who has failed to claim a refund of VAT, by causing him to lose the right to that refund, cannot be regarded as incompatible with the system established by the VAT Directive provided, first, that that period applies in the same way to similar rights in tax matters based on national law and to those based on EU law (principle of equivalence) and, secondly, that it does not in practice make it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the right to a refund of VAT (principle of effectiveness).
As regards the principle of equivalence, the CJEU noted it has no evidence before it capable of raising doubts as to whether the legislation at issue in the main proceedings complies with that principle.
As regards the principle of effectiveness, the CJEU considered that a limitation period of twelve months from the period in which the excess VAT arose does not appear to be capable of making it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for a taxable person or former taxable person to assert his right to a refund of excess VAT. In the immediate case, it is in no way apparent that Modexel sought to assert its right to a refund of the excess VAT, declared at the time of the cessation of its economic activity, before the end of that twelve-month period, and encountered difficulties in that regard. In those circumstances, it must be held that Modexel's exercise of its right to a refund of VAT has not been rendered impossible or excessively difficult in practice.
In summary, the first paragraph of Article 183 must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude national legislation which provides that, when a taxable person ceases his economic activity, that person may not carry excess VAT forward, declared at the time of that cessation of activity, to a following period and may recover that amount only by requesting a refund within 12 months from the date on which that activity ceased, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed.
Comments: Whilst specific to the arrangements provided by Portuguese law, this is a useful reminder to ensure that compliance procedures are in place to ensure the timely recovery of any VAT incurred.